In the last batch of SCV opinions, we got a special treat: another foray into the Lovecraftian depths of appellate jurisdiction, Rutter v. Oakwood Living Centers of Virginia, Inc.
I would have written something earlier, but I’ve had a busy few weeks–two arguments in Richmond, and the birth of our daughter, Catherine Roberts.
Obligatory baby picture after the jump.
Anywho, back to the madness. Here is how Chief Justice Kinser begins her summary of Rutter‘s holding:
In exercising jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction and thereby analyzing the merits of the issue presented on appeal, we conclude that Code Section 8.01-335(B) does not allow the prospective discontinuance or dismissal of an action.
Don’t stare at that sentence too long. You will go insane. Instead, let’s take this one a step at a time:
Rutter brought a wrongful death suit against four defendants: Oakwood, an assisted living facility; one of its contractors, Prism, and two of Prism’s officers, Dixon and Knowlton.
In 2000, Prism filed for bankruptcy. Dixon and Prism filed a notice of bankruptcy, alerting the circuit court that the suit against them was automatically stayed. Reasonable enough.
In response, the circuit court entered an order removing the case from its docket, and purporting to discontinue it if, after three years, there had been no further proceeding under Code Section 8.01-335(B).
In other words, it attempted to enter a self-executing order prospectively discontinuing a case for lack of activity.
Which, you know, sounds like one of those weird things a court shouldn’t be able to do. For ease of reference, we’ll call this ruling the “2000 Order.”
But just in case you needed further convincing, the Fourth Circuit–as reasonable and user-friendly an appellate court as you will find–just dropped an unpublished opinion,
In 2006 and 2007, Bryan Garner interviewed seven members of the current court, including the Chief, about a variety of topics. Video of the interviews has long been available on
I’ve seen even very experienced, very good lawyers–lawyers much better than I’ll ever be–undone by their own nervous energy at oral argument, spitting legal propositions in the panel’s general direction at twice the speed of human comprehension.
Now, I could probably do without the Middle English–surely, Roche marks the last time in the 20th Century that a native ‘Murkin speaker used the verb “to limn”–but this is a vivid, readable, and arrestingly unusual description of the appellate court’s job. It sure beats the dreck that I’ve been churning out: Because this case was decided on summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to blah, blah, blah.
In a remarkable error of judgment, they’ve invited me to speak on a panel about statements of facts in appellate briefs.