The Supreme Court of Virginia dropped a pair of decisions on us last month that highlight the wisdom of Mr. Baldwin’s* worldview–although, oddly enough, neither came up in the context of contracts. Read together, the holdings in Aguilera v. Christian and Shipe v. Hunter make it clear that when the Code or the Rules require a lawyer to sign a pleading, they mean that the lawyer has to physically sign the pleading.

In Aguilera, the Court held that a pro se litigant could not authorize a person who wasn’t authorized to practice law in Virginia to sign a pleading on his behalf.

Aguilera asked his neighbor, who was licensed to practice in DC but not Virginia, to sign a complaint. It appears that he did so on the day before the two-year statute of limitations on his claim ran.

The trial court dismissed the case, and the Supreme Court affirmed. It held that Aguilera’s complaint was a nullity because it was not signed by the party or a lawyer licensed to practice in Virginia.

Shipe is marginally more interesting. It addressed the related question of whether a lawyer who’s licensed in Virginia may authorize a lawyer who is licensed elsewhere, but not in Virginia, to sign a pleading on the Virginia lawyer’s behalf.

The answer, as you’ve surely guessed, is no. The trial court held that the complaint was a nullity, entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the case with prejudice.Continue Reading Only One Thing Counts in This World: Get Them to Sign on the Line Which is Dotted